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Game Theory Analysis of Competition for Groundwater 





  We examine the potential gains from cooperation in the withdrawal of water from 
the Hueco Bolson aquifer that provides municipal water supply for El Paso, Texas and 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.  The aquifer lies beneath the international border, and both cities 
operate independently regarding pumping rates and withdrawals.  We estimate the gains 
by comparing four scenarios in a dynamic setting: 1) a status quo scenario in which both 
cities continue extracting groundwater as they are at present, 2) a Nash non-cooperative 
game scenario, 3) a Nash bargaining scenario, and 4) a scenario that involves maximizing 
the sum of net benefits in both cities.  All scenarios, including the non-cooperative game, 
provide a longer useful life of the Hueco Bolson aquifer than does the status quo.  In the 
Nash bargaining scenario, both cities gain from cooperation and the sum of net benefits 
approaches the maximum that can be obtained by maximizing that value explicitly. 
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Game Theory Analysis of Competition for Groundwater 





  El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico are located 
on the Rio Grande River, which forms a portion of the international border between the 
United States and Mexico.  Since the early 1900s, most of the surface water flowing in the 
southern Rio Grande has been allocated to agricultural users in both countries.  As a 
result, both El Paso and Juarez have relied primarily on groundwater resources to meet 
municipal and industrial water demands.  In particular, both cities have obtained large 
portions of their water supply from the Hueco Bolson aquifer, which extends across the 
international border (Day, 1975, 1978; Armstrong, 1982; Earl and Czerniak, 1996). 
  Annual withdrawals from the Hueco Bolson have exceeded natural recharge rates 
for many years, causing a persistent decline in the volume of water stored in the aquifer 
(Charbeneau, 1982).  Since 1940, water tables have declined by more than 50 feet at many 
of the municipal wellfields serving El Paso and Juarez (Texas Water Development Board, 
1997).  Some authors suggest that the recoverable supply of water in the Hueco Bolson 
will be exhausted at some time between 2005 and 2030, if current pumping rates are 
maintained (Eaton and Andersen, 1987, p. 53; Kuo, 2000; Paso del Norte Water Task 
Force, 2001;).   When depletion occurs, the cost of satisfying municipal and industrial 
water demands in the two cities will increase substantially, as replacement supplies must 
be imported from distant aquifers or purchased from farmers willing to sell or lease a 
portion of their surface water supply. 
   The cost of maintaining water quality in municipal water supplies also may increase   3 
with continued drawdown of the Hueco Bolson aquifer.  The salinity of water remaining in 
the aquifer increases as the volume becomes smaller, and  cones of depression caused by 
excessive pumping may cause salts to move from mud interbeds, degrading groundwater 
quality (Hibbs, 1999).  In addition, contaminants may enter the Hueco Bolson in 
cross-formational flows of water from the Rio Grande aquifer, as the gradient between the 
two aquifers increases with cumulative withdrawals from the Hueco Bolson (Hibbs and 
Boghici, 1999). 
  Water demands have increased in El Paso and Juarez in recent years with 
increasing populations and economic growth stimulated in part by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (Ganster et al., 2000; Peach and Williams, 2000; Clement et al., 
2002).  Recognizing the challenge of providing water supply in future, El Paso began 
developing alternative water sources by leasing irrigation water rights from property 
owners in El Paso County in the 1960s (Day, 1978; El Paso Water Utilities, 1999).  Water 
conservation programs including rebates for acquiring water-saving appliances and a water 
pricing structure that discourages excessive use have been implemented since the early 
1990s (Bath et al., 1994).  As a result, the average per capita consumption of water has 
declined in El Paso and the city has reduced its withdrawals from the Hueco Bolson, while 
increasing its use of surface water.  Per capita incomes and water consumption are much 
lower in Juarez, but the population is larger and growing more rapidly (Zwerneman, 
1977).  Juarez has increased its withdrawals from the Hueco Bolson in recent years, while 
not yet developing alternative water supplies (Chavez, 2000). 
  The Hueco Bolson aquifer will be depleted in the near future if both cities continue 
to extract groundwater at current rates or if they increase annual withdrawals to satisfy 
rising municipal and industrial demands.  Depletion of the aquifer may be inevitable, but it 
may not be optimal from an economic perspective, as there may be value in maintaining 
water in the aquifer to provide municipal supply in years when surface supplies are 
reduced by drought conditions.  If depletion is optimal, the present value of future costs of   4 
providing water supply will vary with the year in which depletion occurs and with 
alternative rates of groundwater withdrawal in the interim. 
  Depletion of the Hueco Bolson may occur more quickly than is optimal because 
neither El Paso nor Juarez has an exclusive right to extract water from the aquifer.  Hence, 
neither city has a clear economic incentive to consider the marginal user cost imposed on 
the other city when determining how much water to withdraw each year.  As a result, the 
sum of annual withdrawals likely will exceed the socially optimal withdrawal in most years 
and the present value of net benefits will not be maximized over time. 
  El Paso and Juarez may gain financially by implementing a cooperative water 
management program in which the cities seek to achieve the optimal use of surface and 
groundwater resources to provide water supply in future.  Such a program may involve 
coordinated development of alternative surface and groundwater resources, and 
agreements regarding annual withdrawals and the volume of water to be maintained in the 
Hueco Bolson, in perpetuity.  The potential gains to both cities may include reductions in 
uncertainty and lower costs of providing water supply in future. 
  The goal of this paper is to describe the potential gains to both cities from 
cooperating in their use of surface and groundwater resources to satisfy municipal and 
industrial water demands.  We estimate the gains by comparing four scenarios in a 
dynamic setting: 1) a status quo scenario in which both cities continue extracting 
groundwater as they are at present, 2) a Nash non-cooperative game scenario, 3) a Nash 
bargaining scenario, and 4) a scenario that involves maximizing the sum of net benefits in 
both cities.  All scenarios, including the non-cooperative game, provide a longer useful life 
of the Hueco Bolson groundwater reserve than does the status quo.  In the Nash 
bargaining scenario, both cities gain from cooperation and the sum of net benefits 
approaches the maximum that can be obtained by maximizing that value explicitly. 
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Conceptual Framework 
 
  Withdrawal of water from the Hueco Bolson by El Paso and Juarez can be viewed 
as a dynamic game in which the two cities may compete or cooperate when choosing the 
volume of water to extract over time.  The potential gains from cooperation include 
reducing the negative impacts of externalities involving pumping costs and depletion of a 
nonrenewable resource.  The pumping cost externality arises because the withdrawal of 
water by either city lowers the level of water in the aquifer, causing the cost of pumping to 
increase for both cities.  The depletion externality arises because annual withdrawals 
greatly exceed natural recharge, and the groundwater likely will be depleted in the near 
future.  Hence, each unit of water removed by either city imposes a marginal user cost on 
both cities because that water will not be available again in the future. 
  In the absence of well-defined property rights to a portion of the aquifer, neither El 
Paso nor Juarez has an economic incentive to consider the pumping cost externality or the 
marginal user cost it imposes on the other city when withdrawing water from the aquifer.  
Pumping decisions based only on direct marginal costs and current marginal benefits of 
groundwater will not be optimal from the perspective of a social planner seeking to 
maximize the sum of net benefits generated with Hueco Bolson water in both cities, over 
time.   As a result, the resource will be extracted more quickly and depletion will occur 
sooner than is optimal as viewed from the broader, social perspective. 
  Pumping cost and resource depletion externalities arise often when groundwater 
and other open access resources are not allocated or priced appropriately to maximize 
social or public net benefits.  A third externality arises when individuals or cities compete 
strategically to gain access and obtain use of a scarce resource.  In a game theory context, 
the strategies employed by one player to gain greater access or use than other players may 
generate costs and activities that would not be undertaken in the absence of strategic 
competition.  For example, one city might install larger pumps and withdraw water more   6 
quickly than otherwise, simply because it is competing with the other city for use of the 
limited groundwater resource.  In the extreme, one city might construct storage facilities 
within its boundaries in which it could store groundwater extracted long before it is 
needed.  Such a pumping and hoarding strategy would generate direct costs and marginal 
user costs that could greatly reduce the social net benefits obtained from the limited 
groundwater. 
  The policy relevance of negative externalities involving open access groundwater 
resources often is a function of physical parameters describing an aquifer and economic 
parameters describing supply and demand characteristics.  For example, the gains in social 
net benefits achieved by regulating a very large, open access aquifer where pumping costs 
do not increase with declining water levels may be too small to justify policy intervention 
(Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Allen and Gisser, 1984).  By contrast, regulation of pumping 
rates or taxation of volumes withdrawn may generate substantial net benefits when 
aquifers are small, when pumping costs increase with declining stock, or when social rates 
of time preference are low (Brill and Burness, 1994). 
  Policy issues regarding the competition for groundwater and the allocation of 
surface water are particularly challenging in the El Paso/Juarez region, as both resources 
are limited in supply and both move across the international border.  While a treaty has 
guided the allocation of surface water for many years, no similar agreement has been 
reached regarding groundwater.  The two cities have not developed a coordinated strategy 
regarding groundwater, although they have begun sharing information regarding 
withdrawals and aquifer characteristics in recent years (Chavez, 2000; Hume, 2000).  The 
potential gains to greater cooperation may be substantial for both cities, given their 
relatively low per capita incomes, the high cost of obtaining alternative water supplies, and 
the high rate of population growth in Juarez. 
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Empirical Model 
 
  Municipal water deliveries in the region are managed by the El Paso Water Utilities 
(EPWU) and the Junta Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento de Ciudad Juarez (JMAS).  The 
long-term goal of each agency might be described as minimizing the present value of the 
costs of providing municipal water supplies.  The annual cost of water delivery will vary 
with the costs of water obtained from different supply sources, such as the Hueco Bolson, 
other aquifers, and surface water sources.  The long-term goal can be described also as 
maximizing the present value of net benefits from water deliveries over time.  Demand 
curves describing the marginal benefits of water consumption are needed when 
constructing an empirical model in which net benefits are maximized.  
  True demand curves for water deliveries are not available for El Paso and Juarez.  
However, the marginal benefit of groundwater can be estimated by considering the cost of 
obtaining the surface water that would be needed to satisfy municipal water demands if 
groundwater were not available.  At present, the per-unit cost of pumping groundwater 
from the Hueco Bolson is less than the per-unit cost of obtaining and treating surface 
water.  Hence, one component of the incremental benefit of pumping groundwater is the 
avoided cost of using surface water.  That is the approach we implement in this study. 
  El Paso has developed several sources of surface water supplies, at prices ranging 
from $15 to $200 per acre-foot.  Juarez has not yet developed alternative sources, but we 
assume that the cost will be higher in Juarez, given that Mexico has a smaller allocation of 
surface water from the Rio Grande than does Texas.  We use these estimates of surface 
water prices to develop marginal benefit curves for groundwater in both cities.  In 
addition, we consider the current cost of groundwater pumping and the observed rate of 
pumping in each city when selecting intercept and slope coefficients for the marginal 
benefit curves.   
  The per-unit cost of obtaining water from the Hueco Bolson will increase, over   8 
time, as the volume of water remaining in the aquifer declines.  Hence, the volume of 
water withdrawn from the aquifer each year generates both a current cost and a long-term 
cost by causing higher pumping costs in future.  In addition, the volume of water 
withdrawn by either city has an impact on future pumping costs for both cities.  This 
interaction is described by per-unit pumping costs that increase with pumping lift, as the 
volume of water remaining in the aquifer is reduced. 
  Our empirical specification of the net benefits from groundwater pumping in each 
city is the following: 
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where:  NBi,t   is the net benefit in city i, in year t,  ht is the pumping lift, in feet, 
w1,t, and w2,t, are the volumes of water withdrawn by El Paso and Juarez in acre-feet per 
year, ci is the per-unit cost of pumping groundwater, in dollars per acre-foot, and ai,t and bi 
are coefficients of the marginal benefit functions.  The initial values of ai,t and the values of 
bi are shown for both cities in Figure 1.  We simulate higher populations in future by 
shifting the marginal benefit functions outward over time using higher values of the 
vertical intercept parameters ai,t. 
  The value of ci is determined by the per-unit cost of energy and pump efficiency 
parameters.  We use a value of $0.10 per acre-foot, per foot of lift, and our initial 
pumping lift is 400 feet.  Hence, the initial pumping cost is $40.00 per acre-foot.  
  The state equation governing changes in the pumping lift, over time, involves the 
sum of withdrawals from the aquifer by both cities, and is given by: 
 
β α − + + = + ) ( , 2 , 1 1 t t t t w w h h  
   9 
 where:    .   is determined by the area and specific yield of the aquifer and 
     ￿  is determined by annual recharge and aquifer characteristics. 
 
Estimates of natural recharge to the Hueco Bolson range from 6,000 to 28,000 acre-feet 
per year (Turner et al., 2002).  We use an estimate of 9,000 acre-feet per year in this 




We examine four scenarios that describe water withdrawals from the Hueco 
Bolson by El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.  All scenarios are dynamic, due to the impact of 
current extractions on pumping lifts in future. We examine first a status quo scenario in 
which both cities maintain current groundwater pumping programs.  El Paso maintains a 
constant rate of withdrawal, while Juarez increases its withdrawals to meet the demands of 
its rising population.  We examine also a non-cooperative game scenario in which both 
cities consider explicitly the impact of cumulative withdrawals on the per-unit cost of 
pumping groundwater and they choose annual withdrawals by equating marginal costs and 
benefits. The non-cooperative game scenario involves slower rates of extraction and 
greater net benefits than the status quo scenario because withdrawals are reduced as the 
marginal cost of pumping increases.  The Nash bargaining scenario describes how both 
cities can increase their net benefits through cooperation.  The sum of net benefits 
obtained in the Nash bargaining scenario approaches the sum that can be obtained by 
choosing extraction paths to maximize the sum of net benefits in both cities.   10 
 
Status Quo Groundwater Pumping 
In the first scenario we assume that El Paso will extract 60,000 acre-feet of 
groundwater each year, while it develops surface water supplies to accommodate 
increases in demand due to rising population and income levels.  By contrast, we assume 
that groundwater pumping by Juarez will increase steadily, over time, to match increasing 
demands, given that an alternative surface water supply has not yet been developed.  This 
assumption is implemented by allowing the marginal benefit curve for groundwater in 
Juarez to shift outward by 2.33% per year.  This is not an optimization scenario because 
we do not require that the marginal benefit of groundwater equals the marginal pumping 
cost.  The scenario simply describes what the future might look like of the two cities 
extract groundwater to meet their future water requirements, with no concern for 
determining optimal cooperative or non-cooperative strategies. 
If both cities continue to implement their current pumping programs, the aquifer 
will essentially be depleted in 18 years, given our empirical estimates of aquifer volume, 
specific yield, and annual recharge.  The present values of net benefits obtained from 
groundwater pumping in that scenario are $9.05 million in El Paso and $75.05 million in 
Juarez (Table 1). The net benefits are much higher in Juarez, given its higher population 
and pumping rates and its higher cost of obtaining surface water as an alternative to 
groundwater.  In year 18, the volume remaining in the aquifer is just 121,000 acre-feet, the 
pumping lift is 1,374 feet, and the marginal cost of pumping is $131 per acre-foot.   11 
 
Non-Cooperative Game Scenario 
   The non-cooperative game differs substantially from the status quo scenario. 
In the game scenario, both Juarez and El Paso choose annual withdrawals to maximize 
their individual net benefits, subject to information regarding the volume withdrawn by the 
other city.  The dynamic game theory model includes two objective functions and two 
first-order necessary conditions that are solved simultaneously in each time period.  We 
use backward induction to solve for the complete time path of optimal extractions for each 
city in the dynamic game theory model.  The objective functions in the model are the 
following:   
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where:   ! is a discount rate and i takes the values of 1 for El Paso and 2 for Juarez.  We 
use a discount rate of 0.05 in the first set of scenarios. 
We construct a recursive algorithm using Maple, a mathematical software product, 
to solve this set of functional equations using dynamic programing.  The results we obtain 
maximize the present value of net benefits for each city, given the volumes withdrawn by 
the other city.  Hence, the time paths represent a dynamic Nash equilibrium.  In addition, 
the solution is subgame perfect because we have obtained it using backward induction 
(Selten, 1975; Petit, 1990).  The recursive equation describing this dynamic programming   12 
problem is the following:  
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where:  Ji,t is the optimal discounted present value of net benefits as viewed from year t 
and looking forward in time. 
The net benefit curves for both cities shift outward over time, to reflect increases 
in population and income levels.  In particular, the intercepts of the net benefit curves 
increase by 1.07% and 2.33% each year in El Paso and Juarez, given that population is 
growing at estimated rates of 1.5% and 3.0%.  We examine 25-year scenarios in this 
analysis, because most of the water will be withdrawn during that time, even with 
cooperation, given the increasing demands in both cities and the high per-unit cost of 
obtaining and treating surface water supplies. 
The goal of net benefit maximization causes both cities to extract groundwater 
more slowly in the non-cooperative game scenario than in the status quo scenario.  As a 
result, 205,000 acre-feet remain in the aquifer at the end of 25 years (Table 1).  The 
pumping lift increases to 1,351 feet and the cost of pumping rises to $131 per acre-foot.  
These ending conditions are similar to those in the status quo scenario, but the aquifer has 
remained viable for seven years longer in the non-cooperative game scenario.  In addition, 
the sum of net benefits is almost twice that obtained in the status quo scenario. 
 
Nash Bargaining 
The Nash bargaining solution is determined by maximizing a mathematical product 
that contains a point in the region of feasible combinations of net benefits for the two 
cities.  That point is called the "threat point" because is represents a default position for   13 
both parties if negotiations leading to a bargaining solution are not successful.  The Nash 
bargaining solution is identified by maximizing the product of distances from the threat 
point to an alternative point on the frontier of the feasible region.  Axioms that 
characterize the Nash bargaining solution require that both parties gain when moving away 
from the threat point and that symmetric parties will move away from the threat point in 
symmetric fashion.  We determine the Nash bargaining solution for groundwater pumping 
from the Hueco Bolson by choosing the values of J1 and J2 that maximize the following 
product: 
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The net benefit values obtained in the non-cooperative game scenario represent the 
threat point (J1
Th, J2
Th) in the Nash bargaining solution.  Hence, the values of J1
Th and J2
Th 
in the equation shown above are $25.0 million for El Paso and $140.1 million for Juarez.  
The Nash bargaining solution we obtain shows clearly that both cities gain by cooperating 
and moving away from the Nash threat point.  In particular, the net benefits increase by 
3.8% for El Paso and by 1.3% for Juarez (Table 1).  The sum of net benefits increases 
from $165.1 million to $167.8 million, an increase of 1.7%.  Much of the gain in net 
benefits is made possible by lower pumping costs, as the pumping lift increases more 
slowly in the cooperative bargaining scenario.  In year 25, the pumping lift is 1,277 feet 
and the marginal cost of pumping is $123 per acre-foot.  The volume remaining in the 
bargaining scenario is 471,000 acre-feet, or more than twice the volume remaining in the 
non-cooperative game scenario. 
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Maximizing the Sum of Net Benefits 
  This scenario describes the problem of a social planner whose goal is to allocate 
water between the two cities in a manner that maximizes the sum of net benefits obtained, 
over time.  The results provide an upper bound estimate of the net benefits that may be 
obtained with limited water resources, and an additional benchmark for evaluating the 
gains achieved through cooperation.  The objective function involves the summation of net 
benefits, NBt, in the two cities, over time:   
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  The results obtained when maximizing the sum of net benefits in this problem are 
similar to those obtained in the Nash bargaining scenario.   The present value of the sum 
of net benefits is $169.05 million, which is just 0.7% greater than the sum obtained with 
Nash bargaining (Table 1).  There are 487,000 acre-feet remaining in the aquifer in year 
25, which is 3.4% greater than the Nash bargaining volume. The net benefits in Juarez 
actually are higher in this scenario than with Nash bargaining, while the net benefits in El 
Paso are lower.  A larger proportion of groundwater pumping is allocated to Juarez in this 
scenario, given its larger population and its higher per-unit cost of obtaining an alternative 
surface water supply.   
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Discussion 
 
Useful Life of the Hueco Bolson 
  The current rates of groundwater pumping by El Paso and Ciudad Juarez are not 
sustainable.  The status quo scenario suggests that the Hueco Bolson will be depleted in 
18 years if current extraction programs are continued.  This estimate is a function of the 
parameter values used in this analysis and it may over-estimate the length of time during 
which Juarez will have affordable access to the Hueco Bolson aquifer.  Some authors have 
suggested that the portion underlying Juarez will be depleted within 5 to 10 years if 
current pumping rates are maintained. 
  The useful life of the groundwater reserve and the net benefits obtained by using 
groundwater are much higher in both the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios.  In 
the non-cooperative game, both cities reduce their rates of withdrawal as the per-unit cost 
of pumping increases over time.  A criterion requiring that marginal benefits equal 
marginal pumping costs is not imposed in the status quo scenario. Hence, the cities can 
gain substantial benefits by equating marginal costs and benefits, even if they compete for 
the limited resource, provided that an alternative surface water supply is available.  If it is 
not, the sum of net benefits is relatively small and the useful life of the resource is quite 
short. 
 
Time Paths of Annual Withdrawals 
  Both El Paso and Juarez withdraw groundwater at a faster rate in the non-
cooperative game scenario than in either the Nash bargaining or the joint maximization 
scenario.  In particular, annual withdrawals by Juarez increase from 85,000 to 160,000 
acre-feet over time in the non-cooperative game scenario, while they begin at only 65,000 
acre-feet if a Nash bargaining agreement is implemented (Figure 2).  Similarly, annual 
withdrawals by El Paso decline from more than 40,000 acre-feet in the non-cooperative   16 
game scenario, while they start at only 35,000 acre-feet in the Nash bargaining solution.  
A program to maximize the present value of the sum of net benefits in both cities would 
allow Juarez to withdraw more water per year than it would in the Nash bargaining 
scenario, while the same program would require El Paso to withdraw less water than in 
the Nash bargaining scenario. 
 
The Sum of Net Benefits 
  The sum of net benefits in the Nash bargaining scenario is greater than the sum 
obtained in the non-cooperative game scenario.  The proportional increase is only 1.7%, 
reflecting perhaps the relative inelasticity of demand in pertinent portions of the marginal 
benefit curves for the two cities.  That is, given the relatively high cost of replacement 
with surface water, groundwater has a substantial incremental value to both cities.   
Annual withdrawals are relatively high in both the non-cooperative and bargaining 
scenarios.  In addition, most of the present value from cooperation is obtained in the early 
years.  The life of the groundwater reserve is extended with cooperation, but the present 
value of that extension is reduced by the impact of discounting. 
  The sum of the present value of net benefits in the Nash bargaining scenario 
($167.85 million) is nearly as large as the sum obtained when maximizing the sum of net 
benefits in the two cities ($169.05 million).  One interpretation of this result is that the 
Nash bargaining solution may be a desirable alternative when joint maximization of net 
benefits is not a viable strategy.  For example, it may not be feasible for a single entity to 
seek the joint maximization of the sum of net benefits in El Paso and Juarez.  However, 
there is not a large loss in potential net benefits if the two cities implement a Nash 
bargaining scenario. 
 
Considering A Smaller Rate of Discount 
  Given the inherent value of drinking water and the potentially serious implications   17 
of shortages in municipal water supplies, it may be inappropriate to discount future net 
benefits in the same way that financial returns are discounted to determine present values. 
City officials concerned about population growth and resource availability may place 
nearly equivalent values on water supplies available in the near term and in 20 years from 
the present.  In one view, the incremental value of water resources may increase with 
larger populations in future, as the impacts of water shortages may be more serious and 
more costly at higher population densities.  
  We examine again the potential gains from cooperation between El Paso and 
Juarez using a discount rate of 1% to reflect a more even consideration of net benefits in 
the near term and in future.  The lower discount rate does not affect the time path of 
withdrawals in the status quo scenario, because the two cities continue their current 
pumping programs regardless of marginal pumping costs.  The present values of net 
benefits are higher, however, as those values are calculated using the lower discount rate 
(Table 2).  The aquifer still is essentially depleted in year 18 when the pumping lift reaches 
1,374 feet. 
  With the lower discount rate, the volumes of water remaining in year 25 increase 
by about 50% in the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.  For example, in the non-
cooperative scenario, the volume remaining in year 25 increases by 54% to 314,000 acre-
feet.  The ending volume increases by 46% to 686,000 acre-feet in the Nash bargaining 
scenario, and that volume is more than twice as large as the ending volume in the non-
cooperative game scenario.  The present value of net benefits obtained with cooperation is 
2.6% higher than the value obtained in the non-cooperative game. As expected, both the 
relative gain in net benefits and the useful life of the groundwater reserve increase when a 
lower discount rate is used to evaluate the net benefits of groundwater availability in 
future. 
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Summary  
 
  The present value sum of net benefits obtained from water resources in El Paso 
and Ciudad Juarez can be enhanced if the cities cooperate in developing a long-term 
program of groundwater withdrawals.  The useful life of the Hueco Bolson can be 
extended with cooperation and the rate of increase in pumping costs can be slowed.  A 
slower rate of growth in pumping costs will generate economic benefits each year, while 
an extended useful life will provide additional time for the cities to develop alternative 
water sources.  El Paso already has begun building a portfolio of surface water options, 
while Juarez is planning to obtain groundwater from an aquifer located some distance 
from the city.  Juarez also may require surface water to meet its requirements in future, 
but a market for purchasing water rights from farmers is not yet available in the region. 
  Water demands are increasing more rapidly in Juarez than in El Paso, due to the 
rapidly increasing population in Juarez.  Population growth is driven, in part, by migration 
of individuals from central and southern Mexico in search of economic opportunities in 
border cities.  A more complete analysis of water supply and demand issues in the El 
Paso/Juarez region would examine optimal strategies for improving water quality and 
water supply reliability, while also improving the efficiency of water use and developing 
alternative supplies.  Efforts to improve water quality and water supply are particularly 
important in Juarez, where the per capita consumption of water is much lower than in El 
Paso.  The game theory framework presented in this paper may be helpful in examining the 
potential gains from implementing cooperative strategies for addressing several water 
management issues in El Paso and Juarez, including water supply and water quality.  In 
particular, it may be helpful in examining opportunities for investing in facilities and 
programs that will encourage efficient use of water resources while enhancing the quality 
of life for residents of both cities and improving the outlook for economic growth and 
development in the border region.   19 
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Table 1.  Present Value of Net Benefits in Alternative Scenarios (million dollars) 
 
Discount Rate is 5%,  25-year Scenario  (Pumping ends in year 18 in status quo scenario). 
 Status  quo




Bargaining  Max Sum NB 
EL Paso     9.05    25.00    25.95    22.50 
Juarez      75.05  140.10  141.90  146.55 
Sum        84.10 165.10 167.85  169.05 
        
Ending 
Conditions        
Volume  
(1,000 Acre-Feet)          121    205    471     487 
Pumping Lift (Feet)       1,374  1,351  1,277  1,272 
Pumping Cost 
($/Acre-Foot)          131     131    123     122 
1See text for description of the status quo scenario.  
2Net benefits in this scenario form the threat point for the bargaining scenario.  
 
Table 2.   Present Value of Net Benefits in Alternative Scenarios (million dollars) 
 
Discount Rate is 1%,  25-year Scenario  (Pumping ends in year 18 in status quo scenario). 
  Status  quo




Bargaining  Max Sum NB 
EL Paso      8.60     36.25    38.60    29.80 
Juarez        99.55  223.60  228.10  239.95 
Sum         108.15  259.85  266.70         269.75 
        
Ending 
Conditions        
Volume  
(1,000 Acre-Feet)         121    314    686     704 
Pumping Lift (Feet)      1,374  1,321  1,217  1,211 
Pumping Cost 
($/Acre-Foot)         131     128    116     116 
1See text for description of the status quo scenario.  









































Volume, wt (1,000 Acre-Feet) 
Marginal Benefit 
($/A.F.) 
Juarez: MB=180 - 2w1 
El Paso: MB=140 - 1.2w1 
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